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The case bf Schuyler v. Citlis,i is 'ot sO n';6vel a characte that ih §pite of the nuhieious coinmeits which weie
imad6 upon it both in thib legal peridicals and the daily
nei;spapers, When the final decision was rendered two yedi-s
ago by the Court of Appeals, I shall venture, even at this late
date, to discuss just how far that decision went and pai-ticularly what the opinion of Judge Peckham did not decide.
Indeed, such a discussion seems especially useful, since the
scope of the opinion in the Court of Appeals has been ofteh
misunderstood.
Schuyler v. Ciurtis was a suit brought by Philip Schuylei-,
the nephew and stepson of Mary Hamilton Schuyler afid the
authorized representative of all her immediate relatives, against
the "Woman's Memorial Fund Association," a voluntary
unincorporated association, to enjoin the members of it from
making a statue of Mary Hamilton Schuyler or from causing
it to be exhibited at the World's Fair. The avowed object of
I147 N. Y. 434-
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the association was the completion of two statues to honor
"Woman as the Philanthropist" and "Woman as the Reformer" at the Columbian Exposition in 1893.
The association solicited subscriptions to promote this
object, and employed Hartley, the sculptor, to make an ideal
statue of Mrs. Schuyler as "The Typical Philanthropist."
The association had also undertaken a statue Qf Susan B.
Anthony to be designated "The Representative Reformer,"
and had announced the intention of placing the statue of Mrs.
Schuyler on exhibition as a companion piece to it, although
Mrs. Schuyler took no interest in the woman's rights movements, had no sympathy with them, and would have objected
to having her name coupled with that of Miss Anthony.
Neither the art association nor any of the members of it had
ever asked any of the relatives of Mrs. Schuyler for permission
to make or exhibit an ideal statue representing her. Upon
learning of the proposed statue her relatives at once objected
to it, and in a polite letter by Philip Schuyler, requested the
association to abandon the project. Mr. Schuyler wrote:
" Mrs. Schuyler, though taking her share with others in the
philanthropic work of her day, is in no sense the typical philanthropist, and to place her in such a position is to invite
public criticism of a sort which has already been made in the
press.
"In behalf of her family, whose sentiment on this subject is
conveyed in this letter, I respectfully request that the project,
so far as she is concerned, be abandoned."
The association formally refused to abandon the project of
the statue in an official letter to Mr. Schuyler, and denied
the right of Mrs. Schuyler's relatives to be consulted in the
matter. The point of view of the association is perfectly illustrated by extracts from this extraordinary document. In
speaking of Mrs. Schuyler the letter says:
" Her character, her work, her life, belong to those who
sympathize with culture, with art, philanthropy and reform.
In so joining ' the choir invisible whose music is the gladness
of the world' she belongs to all who live after her. As our
poet Halleck says of one dead: ' For these are freedom's now
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and fame's . . .' As Emerson says of a famous character:
' Having neither wife nor child, father or mother, every one
who thinks is his child, and every one who receives his inspiration is his descendant.'
" For these reasons we cannot believe it is our duty to the
public, to the cause of free art education, or to ourselves to
comply with the request to have the project to memorialize
Mary M. Hamilton Schuyler abandoned.
"We therefore will continue our efforts and ask subscriptions from all who are in sympathy . . ."

How far the contention that Mrs. Schuyler ever became a
public character was from the truth can be seen from the following testimony (given at the trial) of those who knew her best:
"She was a singularly sensitive woman; and while quite
willing to do good deeds, she was of a very retiring nature
and was most anxious to keep her name, as many people of
course are, from the public prints.
". .. She was a woman of great charm and a woman of
great ability; everybody respected her; everybody loved her;
she was in no sense a woman before the public; she was
interested in her charities just as hundreds of other ladies are,
and she gave a part of her life to them."
Mr. Justice Morgan J. O'Brien, who granted the injunction
pendente lite against the making or erecting of a statue, stated
the real facts of the case when he said:
"It has not been shown that Mrs. Schuyler ever came
within the category of what might be denominated public
characters.
"She was undoubtedly a woman of rare gifts and of a broad
and philanthropic nature; but these she exercised as a private
citizen in an unobtrusive way."
The trial court made the injunction permanent and used the
following language in its findings: " That the acts of the
defendants

. . .

have exposed the

name and

memory of

Mary M. Hamilton Schuyler to adverse comment and
public criticism of a nature peculiarly disagreeable to
her relatives, and have caused disagreeable notoriety for
which they are in no way responsible . . . That annoyance
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and pain have been caused thereby to the plaintiff and to the
immediate relatives of the said Mrs. Schuyler, and that he and
they have been and are greatly distressed and injured thereby
and by the notoriety incident thereto; and that such notoriety
and adverse comment and criticism are wholly due to the
unauthorized acts of the defendants.
"That the acts of the defendants . . constitute and are a
continuing injury to the plaintiff and to the . . . relatives of

. . . Mary M. Hamilton Schuyler; that they have no adequate
remedy at law for the redress of the injuries and wrongs complained of . . and that great and irreparable injury will be
caused to the memory of . . . Mrs. Schuyler and to her

surviving relatives unless the defendants be enjoined from the
further prosecution of the acts so complained of . .
The court found as conclusions of law:
First: That the acts of the defendants were an unlawful
interference with the right of privacy.
Second: That the surviving relatives of Mrs. Schuyler were
specially injured thereby.
Third: That the plaintiff was entitled to judgment perpetually enjoining the defendants from making a statue of Mrs.
Schuyler in any form or from causing it to be exhibited.
The judgment of the trial court was affirmed by the Supreme
Court at General Term, and when the case came before the
Court of Appeals the merits had been passed upon by six
justices of the Supreme Court. Three of them had written
careful opinions in which the merits of the plaintiff's right were
fully discussed, and all had, without hesitation, held that the
plaintiff's right of privacy had been infringed and supported
the injunction.
In the Court of Appeals, however, the judgment was reversed and the injunction dissolved. Fortunately for the
Schuyler family, the World's Fair had long passed, and there
was no practical danger that the defendants would ever erect
a statue of Mrs. Schuyler. Judge Peckham, who wrote the
opinion in the Court of Appeals, stated the grounds upon
which the court based the reversal in his own characteristically
forceful terms :

SCHUYLER AGAINST CURTIS AND THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY.

749

"Whatever right of privacy," he says, "Mrs. Schuyler had,
died with her. Death deprives us all of rights in the legal
sense of that term, and when Mrs. Schuyler died her own
individual right of privacy, whatever it may have been, expired
at the same time. The right which survived (however extensive or limited) was a right pertaining to the living alone. It
is the right of privacy.of the living which it is sought to enforce
here. That right may, in some cases, be itself violated by
improperly interfering with the character or memory of a
deceased relative, but it is the right of the living, not that of
the dead, which is recognized . . .
"We cannot assent to the proposition that one situated as
the plaintiff in this case can properly enjoin such action as the
defendants propose on the ground that, as a mere matter of
fact, his feelings would be thereby injured. We hold that in
this class of cases there must in addition be some reasonable
and plausible ground for the existence of this mental distress
and injury. It must not be the creation of mere caprice nor
of pure fancy nor the result of a supersensitive and morbid
mental organization dwelling with undue emphasis upon the
exclusive and sacred character of this right of privacy . . .
A proposed act which a court will enjoin because it would be
a violation of a legal right must, among other conditions, be
of such a nature as a reasonable man can see, might and
probably would cause mental distress and injury to any one
possessed of ordinary feeling and intelligence situated in like
circumstances as the complainant, and this question must
"always to some extent be one of law. If the circumstances
be such that it is to a court inconceivable that the feelings of
any sane and reasonable person could be injured by the
proposed act, then it is the duty of the court to say so
and to refuse an injunction which would prevent its performance.
".. . We think that so long as the real and honest purpose
is to do honor to the memory of one who is deceased and
-such purpose is to be carried out in an appropriate and orderly
manner by reputable individuals and for worthy ends, the
consent of the descendants of such deceased person is not
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necessary and they have no right to prevent for their own
personal gratification any action of the nature described."
Judge Gray wrote a dissenting opinion and said among other
things:
" I must emphatically dissent from the decision of this
court that there was no ground shown in this case for the
equitable relief which was granted below. That a precisely
analogous case may not have arisen heretofore in which the
peculiar power of a court of equity to grant relief by way of
injunction has been exercised, furnishes no reason against the
assumption of jurisdiction . . .
" It seems to me clear that the jurisdiction of equity is not
made to depend upon the existence of corporeal property, and
that it is exercised whenever the complainant establishes his
claim to the possession of exclusive personal rights and their
violation in definite ways for which an action at law cannot
afford plain and adequate redress. That is the case here . . .
" However opinions may differ with respect to the substantial injury to the feelings of Mrs. Schuyler's relatives, we have
t/e finding that it was in fact caused and we should not say
that it was merely fanciful. The theory of the case which
calls for equitable relief is not that of a mere protection to
wounded feelings, but the protection of a right which those
who represent the deceased have to her name and memory as
a family heritage and which had not become the public property. Why is that not a legal and exclusive interest and
why are its possessors not entitled to -be protected by the law
from a notoriety which invites public criticism of the memory
and reputation of the deceased relative? "
I have given a very full statement of the facts of Schuyler
v. Curtis because a knowledge of them is necessary to a
proper understanding of the attitude taken by the Court of
Appeals and the real scope of Judge Peckham's opinion.
From these facts and the opinion, I think it is not an exaggeration to say that the decision of the Court of Appeals
enunciates no legal principle whatever. The six judges in the
court below had decided that the plaintiff had a right of
privacy and that the conduct of the defendants was such as to
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cause annoyance and pain to the plaintiff and to invade that
;ght of privacy. The Court of Appeals did not deny the
_. :stence of the right, but simply held that they had the
power as an ultimate question to decide whether the conduct
of the defendants had really been sufficiently annoying to the
plaintiff to deserve judicial attention. The court answered the
question in the negative and in spite of the solemn finding of
six judges of the Supreme Court, evidently concurred in by
Judge Gray to the effect that the defendants had subjected
the name of Mrs. Schuyler to public comment and disagreeable
notoriety, and had caused annoyance and pain to her relatives,
nevertheless held that it was "inconceivable that the feelings of
any sane and reasonable person could be injured by the proposed act."
It is thus evident that the Court of Appeals, whatever dicta
it may have indulged in, really reversed the case, not because
of any theoretical difficulty with the plaintiff's claim, but
because of the triviality of his grievance. "LDe minimis non
curat lex" was the real ground of the decision.
The state of the law then seems to be this: The Supreme
Court of New York has asserted the existence of a right to
privacy in three well considered opinions.' Judge Gray has
strongly reaffirmed the existence of such a right in his dissenting opinion in the Court of Appeals when the injunction
in Schuyler v. Curtis2 was dissolved by that tribunal and
the majority in the Court of Appeals, while refusing to pass
upon the general principle which the plaintiff in that suit
sought to maintain, has in no wise, either directly or by
implication, denied the existence of a right to privacy.
There is, so far as I have discovered, no decision against
the existence of the right to privacy unless it be Murray v.
Lithographing Co.,3 decided by the Special Term of the Court
of Common Pleas of New York City, which was a decision by
a single judge of a courf of inferior jurisdiction..

I Schuyler v. Curtis, O'Brien, J., 15 N. Y. Supp. 787; Schuyler v.
Curtis, Van Brunt, P. J., 64 Hun. 594; Schuyler v. Curtis, Ingraham, J.,
24 N. Y. Supp. 509.
2 147 N. Y. at p. 452.

349 Alb. L. J. 287.
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The case of Corliss v. Company' has no direct bearing on
the question in Schuyler v. Curtis because the suit was there by
the relatives of a famous inventor, and it was held that a public
character surrendered his right to privacy.
So far then as the few cases go which are directly in point,
there is a right to privacy possessed by every one. The
question remains whether these cases are sufficiently consonant
with the principles of the common law to be generally followed.
I could not hope, within the limits of this article, to discuss
the various legal analogies invoked on behalf of the plaintiff
in the Schuyler case in order to establish the right to privacy.
Many of them were borrowed from the able article by Messrs.
Warren and Brandeis, entitled "The Right to Privacy," published in the HarvardLaw Review, Vol. IV, p. 193. Indeed,
the authors of that article may flatter themselves with having
pointed the way for both court and counsel in the Schuyler
case. Their position has been controverted by Mr. Herbert
Spencer Hadley in the Northwestern Law Review, Vol. III,
p. I, in a careful and logical article which doubtless carries
complete conviction to some minds. If one is inclined to be
very strict in adherence to the letter of the law, and as it
seems to me, with all due deference to Mr. Iadley, somewhat
technical and narrow, Mr. Hadley's article will be convincing.
A great argument of those who deny the existence of a
right to privacy is always based on expressions found in some
of the cases that an injunction will only issue to protect
property. But such expressions are misleading. The confusion arises, it is believed, from a misconception as to what
is the real legal nature of propert'. Judge Selden defined
the meaning of property very accurately, as follows:
" Property is the right of any person to possess, use, enjoy
and dispose of a thing. The term, though frequently applied
to the thing itself, in strictness means only the rights of the
owner in relation to it.2
This distinction between the object itself and the legal rights
157 Fed. Rep. 431 ; 1b. 64 Fed. Rep. 281.
2

Wyneharner v. People, 13 N. Y. 433 ; Eaton v. R. R. Co., 51 N. H.
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pertaining to it is referred to in the opinion of the learned
referee, in Matter of Beekinan Street, as follows :
"The dividing line between property as a thing objectively
appropriated by a person, and a personal right as subjectively
belonging to a person, is not always entirely distinct: "I
In other words, the only scientific conception of property is
not that of a horse, or a piece of land, or any object; but it is
that of a bundle of legal rights--" indefinite in point of use,
unrestricted in point of disposition, over a determinate thing,"
2
as Austin puts it.
It is certain that equity will protect numerous rights which
are not sufficiently extensive to be denominated property; -for
example, the rights of a sender of a letter do not fulfill the conditions of the definition of property just given; for they are
neither "indefinite in point of user," nor " unrestricted in point
of disposition." Indeed, there can, strictly speaking, be no
property in a letter as such. It has been held that an indictment will not lie for larceny of a letter: Payne v. People, 6
Johns. 103 ; that private letters are not assets in the hands of
an executor which he may liquidate: Eyre v. Higber, 35 Barb.
502; that the writer of a letter cannot retain it even if he
have got it back fairly; but the receiver may maintain detinue
for the paper: Oliver v. Oliver, II C. B.U.S. 139; and that
the writer of a letter cannot compel the recipient to give it
up: Grigsby v. Breckinridge, 2 Bush (Ky.), 480. In short,
the only right recognized in the sender of a letter is to prevent its publication. Equity will protect that right, because
there is no way in which it can be adequately protected at
law.
That equity will protect the single right to prevent publication in the case of letters shows conclusively that the courts
recognize the absurdity of refusing to protect one right, because the person asking for relief has not others accompanying it, or because that right is not related to the ownership
of a tangible object.
The things which ordinarily need protection are, undoubt-

14 Bradford, New York Surrogate,
2Jurisprudence, Lect. 47.

Appendix, p. 516.
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edly, even nowadays, physkal objects capable of ownership.
In early times nothing else was protected, because nothing
else was understood or valued. But as civilization has advanced,
the Court of Chancery has kept pace with the needs of the time,
and always has protected a real substantialr/ght,-oftentimes
calling it property, because, ordinarily, subjects of litigation
were tangible objects, in which there was a right "indefinite in
point of user ;" but, yet, never failing to give relief, however
far the right in the particular case might be from the full
ownership of a physical olect.
It is thus evident, as the learned authors of "The Right to
Privacy" say, that:
"The legal doctrines relating to infractions of what is
ordinarily termed the common-law right to intellectual and
artistic property are . . . but instances of a general right of
privacy, which, properly understood, afford a remedy for the
evils under consideration."
It is undoubtedly, however, still frequently said that a court
of equity can interfere by injunction only where a right of
property has been invaded, Mr. Hadley, in the able article
already mentioned, made this very point one of his two principal reasons for denying the existence of the right to
privacy for which I am here contending.
In disagreeing with him I am not consciously, at least, explaining the results reached in the decisions by my own
reasons, and disregarding the language of the judges, or, to
use the words of a learned legal critic, " treating the rulings
of the court as the utterances of Balaam's ass, absolutely true,
but not presupposing any conscious intelligence in the creatures from whom they proceed." It cannot be denied that in
a few cases the champions of the right to privacy have claimed
that the court, in allowing an injunction on the ground that
a right of property was involved, has reached the right result
by wrong reasoning. But in numbers of cases the judges h y,
an injunction where they have either emphatically
a
declared, or tacitly admitted, that the right infringed was not a
property right within the usual meaning of that term.
Particularly has this been true in the cases where a person
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has been allowed to enjoin the mutilation or removal of the
'body of a deceased relative, or to sue at law for the conse,aent damages. These cases certainly go to show that an
invasion of a property right is not the test of equitable interference, for there is at common law no property in a dead body.'
In fact, the principal difficulty in establishing the existence
of the right to privacy really lies not in the mere belief than an
injunction must operate upon property rights, but upon the
half conscious further belief that all legal rights must operate
upon tangible objects and be readily measurable in dollars and
cents. Two recent decisions answer most conclusively this
fallacious idea. Both these cases were actions at law by a
wife for the dissection of the body of her deceased husband by
physicians, without her consent, and in both, in accordance
with the settled law of this country, an injunction would have
been granted to protect the wife's legal right of sepulture.
The following language of Justice Mitchell, in Larson v.
Chase,' the first of the two cases I have referred to, throws
light upon the whole subject discussed in this article and
shows an instance where mental annoyance and distress are
the sole basis of a right of action :
"There has been a great deal of misconception and confusion as to when, if ever, mental suffering, as a distinct
element of damage, is a subject for compensation. . This has
frequently resulted from courts giving a wrong reason for a
correct conclusion that in a given case no recovery could be
had for mental suffering, placing it on the ground that mental
suffering as a distinct element of damage is never a proper
subject of compensation, when the correct ground was that the
act complained of was not an infraction of any legal right, and
hence not an actionable wrong at all, or else that the mental
suffering was not the direct and proximate effect of the
wrongful act . . . But where the wrongful act constitutes an

infringement on a legal right mental suffering may be recovered
AMalter of Becknan Street, 4 Bradford (N. Y.), 503-532 ; Mitchell v.
77orne, 134 N. Y. 536; Foley v. Phelps, r App. Div. 551 ; Snyder v.
Snyder, 6o How. Pr. (N. Y.) 368; Veld v. lValker, i3OIvMass. 422; Pierce
v. Proprietors,io R. I. 227; Wynkoop v. Wj'nkoop, 42 Pa. 293.
2 47 Mlinn. 307.
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for if it is the direct, proximate and natural result of the
wrongful act. It was early settled that substantial damages
might be recovered in a class of torts where the only injury
suffered is mental, as, for example, an assault without physical
contact. So, too, in actions for false imprisonment where the
plaintiff was not touched by the defendant, substantial damages
have been recovered, though physically the plaintiff did not
suffer any actual detriment."
And Justice Patterson of the New York Supreme Court
uses similar language in the still more recent case of Foley v.

Phelps.1
"But we are not disposed to put the right of the plaintiff to
maintain this action on the ground of a property right in the
remains of her husband, nor do we think that the discussion
is properly placed when it is rested exclusively upon that
proposition. Irrespective of any claim of property, the right
which inhered in the plaintiff as the decedent's widow, and in
one sense. his nearest relative, was a right to the possession of'
the body for the purpose of burying it; that is, to perform a
duty which the law required some one to perform, and which
it was her right by reason of her relationship to the decedent
to perform..... If this right exists, as we think it clearly
does, the invasion or violation of it furnishes a ground for a
civil action for damages. It is not a mere idle utterance, but
a substantial legal principle, that wherever a real right is
violated a real remedy is afforded by the law. A right to
vote can in no sense be called a pure right of property; it is.
merely a personal right; yet who would now contend that a
person obstructing a voter's right or preventing his voting
would not be, irrespective of any statutory enactment, liable,
even if the candidate of the choice of the person thus
obstructed was elected."
To hold in the face of these decisions that there can be no
invasion of the right to privacy, because no right of property
in the strict sense of the term is in dispute, and that consequently no injunction can issue to prevent repeated and
I I App.

Div. 55 r .
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continued violations of such legal right, seems, to say the
least, technical aud conservative.
To answer briefly, then, the objection of Mr. Hadley that
an injunction cannot be granted to prevent the invasion of the
right of privacy, because no right of property is involved,
I would say that a legal right of property is not a sine qua
non to the granting of an injunction. To answer the general
objection that mental distress is never a ground for an action,
I would deny the truth of such an assertion. If no legal
right is infringed, mental suffering will not support an action,
but neither would physical suffering. The question is simply
-is there a legal right to privacy? If there is, the objections
as to the mode of protecting it disappear.
Mr. Hadley further says that no remedy by injunction
should be given for invasion of privacy, because, where the
invasions of privacy have gone so far as to get into the field
of libel, they cannot be enjoined. The question as to whether
a libel could be enjoined long remained open in England
owing to conflicting decisions, until finally the present statute
was passed, authorizing an injunction in certain cases. But
the whole subject of libel is, for historical reasons, suigeneris.
English history is filled with attempts by one political faction
to use the action of libel as an engine of oppression to the
other. Hence there has been a constant tendency in that
action in every Anglo-Saxon jurisdiction to protect the defendant and to restrict the remedies of the plaintiff in a way that
can only be explained upon historical grounds peculiar to libel
itself.
Moreover, there is an adequate remedy for invasions of
privacy which are libellous, by means of the civil and criminal
actions for libel. The interposition of chancery is, therefore,
in these cases unnecessary, and, for the purely historical
reasons already mentioned is, in some jurisdictions at least,
without warrant. No reason can be given why chancery
should refuse to protect the privacy of individuals in cases
where the invasion is not libellous, because it cannot protect
it where the invasion is libellous, unless it be to preserve the
symmetry of the law at the expense of the very ends for which
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every civilized system of law works. It is submitted that the
historical, and, as it were, piecemeal growth of the common
law, has naturally, if not necessarily, produced many inconsistencies in the system, and that inconsistency with some
other branch of the law is, therefore, not a conclusive argument against a result practically very desirable. In fact the
inability of a court of equity to enjoin a libel seems exceptional and inconsistent, and the protection given to the right
to privacy by the court in the Schuyler case, whereby alone
that right can be of any real avail, natural and sensible.
The practical desirability of recognizing and protecting the
right to privacy is so well shown by the learned writers in the
HarvardLaw Review, already mentioned, that I quote what
they have written without further comment. They say:
" Recent inventions and business methods call attention to
the next step which must be taken for the protection of the
person and for securing to the individual what Judge Cooley'
Instantaneous photographs
calls the right 'to be let alone.'
and newspaper enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts of
private and domestic life; and numerous mechanical devices
threaten to make good the prediction that ' what is whispered
in the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-tops.' For
years there has been a feeling that the law must afford some
remedy for the unauthorized circulation of portraits of private
persons .
" Of the desirability-indeed the necessity-of .

. .

protec-

tion (of the right to privacy) there can, it is believed, be no
doubt. The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety and of decency. Gossip is no longer
the resource of the idle and of the vicious, but has become a
trade which is pursued with industry as well as effrontery. To
satisfy a prurient taste the details of sexual relations are spread
broadcast in the columns of the daily papers. To occupy the
indolent, column upon column is filled with idle gossip which
can only be procured by intrusion upon the domestic circle.
The intensity and complexity of life attendant upon advancing
civilization have rendered necessary some retreat from the
I Cooley on Torts, 2d Ed. p. 29.
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world, and man, under the refining influence of culture, has
become more sensitive to publicity, so that solitude and
privacy have become more essential to the individual; but
modern enterprise and invention have, through invasions upon
his privacy, subjected him to mental pain and distress far
greater than could be inflicted by mere bodily injury."
If, then, the protection of the privacy of the individual is
practically so desirable, why should the law hesitate to give
that protection ? I believe it appears from the foregoing considerations that excellent legal analogies can be invoked in
support of such a right and none of the arguments against it
are at all convincing. In view of these facts I cannot but confidently look to see the principles laid down. by the lower
courts in Schuyler v. Curtis, generally followed.
The limits of a right which has been so little defined by"
judicial decision are at present of course vague, and it can
only be said that the limits of this right, like the right of personal liberty, of which it is an extension if not a part, must be
determined by the relative demands of individual freedom and
public convenience or necessity.
New Yrork City.
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